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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 13-4595 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JEAN A. SERAPHIN, 
 
       Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-10-cr-00229-004) 
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 12, 2015 
 
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed January 29, 2015) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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On March 3, 2010, Appellant Jean A. Seraphin as well as Brent Hercules Antoine, 
Richard G. Foster and Ramar Gardiner went on a shopping spree in Southwestern 
Pennsylvania.  In all, they visited five Walmarts, nine Giant Eagle grocery stores, and 
two GetGo convenience stores.  The group’s principal aim was to obtain merchandise 
worth thousands of dollars using fraudulently procured credit cards.     
 The group’s “carding” scheme was going along without a hitch until they reached 
the Walmart in Bethel Park.  At that location, both Foster and Antoine separately tried to 
purchase several gift cards and electronics.  Both attempts were unsuccessful.  Foster, for 
his part, looked to purchase a $1,500 Walmart gift card, but all of the credit cards he 
submitted for payment were declined.  Then Antoine, in another part of the store, offered 
seven different credit cards to purchase two iPods and two laptops.  But the cashier 
cancelled the transaction because the signature on the seventh card appeared suspect.  
After the pair left, a cashier alerted area Walmarts of the suspicious transactions. 
Within the hour, the group arrived at their next stop: a Walmart just down the road 
in Carnegie.  Foster again attempted to purchase Walmart gift cards with a fraudulent 
credit card.  And while this time the transaction was approved, he unexplainably changed 
his mind about the purchase and left the store.  Close in time and true to form, another 
(but this time unidentified) man tried to purchase iPods and a notebook computer in a 
different part of the store.  But none of the six cards he used went through.  He declined 
the cashier’s invitation to speak to management or call his credit card company and 
instead left.  According to several eyewitnesses, he appeared nervous.     
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 Sensing that a carding scheme was ongoing, the loss-prevention employee at the 
Carnegie Walmart called local law enforcement and recorded the license tag of the 
minivan Foster got into.  Officers arrived just in time to stop the group before they made 
their way out of the parking lot.  Inside the minivan officers found four males (Antoine, 
Foster, Gardiner and Seraphin).  Officers also noticed a safe in the back row, located 
between the captain seats in which Antoine and Seraphin were seated.  Because none of 
the men were listed as authorized drivers in the rental agreement for the minivan, officers 
decided to impound the rental and instructed the group to remove any personal 
belongings.  Notably, no one claimed ownership of the safe.  
 Officers secured a warrant to search the locked safe.  Inside, they found eleven 
plastic bags, each of which contained gift cards and receipts.  The gift cards had all been 
purchased on the same day (March 3, 2010) and were grouped according to the store in 
which each card was bought.  Also present were 39 credit cards.  The credit cards were in 
the name of either Brandon Anderson or Sean Francis—neither of whom had a 
connection to any member of the group—and had been used to purchase the gift cards.  
 Approximately eight months later, on November 15, 2010, and in a seemingly 
unrelated incident, Seraphin, Gardiner and another individual, Mark Daniel, were 
involved in a border search near the Canada-New York border, on the Canadian side of 
the Peace Bridge.  A federal agent learned that the search revealed brand new 
merchandise without receipts and that Daniel was in possession of five counterfeit credit 
cards.  Among the products found inside were: (a) four iPod Touches in their original 
wrapping; (b) three iPads; (c) a printout listing the location of western New York 
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Walmarts; (d) 33 gift cards; (e) five X-box games; (e) two lap-top computers; (f) 10 cell 
phones; and (g) two counterfeit checks.  The agent conducting the search also learned 
that Seraphin and Gardiner were the subject of a pending credit card investigation in 
Pittsburgh. 
Seraphin and Antoine were ultimately charged with: (1) conspiracy to engage in 
access device fraud; (2) possession of 15 or more counterfeit or unauthorized access 
devices; and (3) three counts of aggravated identify theft.  They were tried jointly and 
convicted on all counts.  (Foster and Gardiner were charged with slightly different crimes 
and entered guilty pleas.)  The District Court sentenced Seraphin to 36 months’ 
imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release.    
 Seraphin raises two arguments on appeal: that the District Court abused its 
discretion in allowing the Government to introduce evidence of the Peace Bridge 
incident; and that there was insufficient evidence at trial to convict him of the crimes for 
which he was charged.   
 Seraphin contends that evidence of the Peace Bridge incident had “no logical 
connection” to the crimes he was being tried for and was introduced only to paint him as 
a criminal.  In support, he highlights a passage from the Government’s closing argument 
where it stressed the unlikelihood that Seraphin could have found himself in two 
strikingly similar situations without engaging in any wrongdoing: 
Wow. How unique.  Gardner [sic] is driving the car on the Peace Bridge 
in New York eight months after this happened in March 2010.  
November 2010, eight months later, we see Gardner [sic] and Seraphin 
together again in a car and what’s in that car?  Counterfeit checks, 
electronic merchandise, two laptop computers.   
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Wait a minute.  If he didn’t have bad luck, he wouldn’t have no luck at 
all.  What are the odds?  Now its not evidence - - well, we are not saying 
that [because] he was caught later on in Buffalo, he must have been 
doing it in Pittsburgh, but it is evidence for you to consider he intended 
to have a conspiracy eight months earlier with these guys. 
 
 Our analysis of Seraphin’s argument unfolds in two steps.  Was evidence of the 
Peace Bridge incident admitted for a proper purpose under Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b)?  If it was, we assess whether its probative value was substantially outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect.  
 Under Rule 404(b), the Government can’t offer evidence of a defendant’s bad acts 
to impugn his character or suggest he has a penchant for committing certain crimes. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).  The same evidence is, however, admissible if it is introduced to 
rebut the assertion that defendant’s “association with criminal co-conspirators was wholly 
innocent” or that he was “‘merely present’ at the scene of criminal activity without guilty 
knowledge or intent.”  United States v. Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 110, 119 (1st Cir. 2000).    
 We are convinced that the evidence of the Peace Bridge incident belongs in the 
latter box, principally because it was introduced to give the jury a reason to view 
Seraphin’s defense with more than a shade of skepticism and in turn “conclude that he 
was a knowing and intentional participant in the crimes charged in the indictment.”  Id.  
For similar reasons—and because of the circumstantial nature of the Government’s 
case—its probative value was significant. 
We highlight that the District Court’s limiting instruction—given twice—
mitigated any prejudice.  Both times, the Court admonished the jury to consider the 
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evidence only for the dual purpose of determining whether there was a relationship 
between Seraphin and Gardiner and whether he had the knowledge and intent to engage 
in the charged conspiracy.  Against this background, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion and properly admitted the evidence under Rule 404(b). 
 Seraphin’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is on even weaker footing.  
Regarding the conspiracy count, he contends that the Government didn’t produce any 
evidence of actual guilt other than his presence in the van with the three other occupants.  
And, for the substantive counts, he contends that the evidence at trial wasn’t enough to 
convince a rational trier of fact that he either produced, used or trafficked in counterfeit 
access devices or possessed those devices. 
 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “review the record 
in [a] light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of 
fact could find proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Brodie, 403 
F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005).  In doing so, we are careful not to “usurp the role of the 
jury by weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or by substituting [our] 
judgment for that of the jury.”  Id.  Stated another way, “[w]e must sustain the [jury’s] 
verdict if there is substantial evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
government, to uphold the jury’s decision[.]”  United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 
170 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).   
 Ample evidence supported all of Seraphin’s convictions.  As to the conspiracy 
count, while it is true that mere presence isn’t enough to support a finding of conspiracy, 
the evidence at trial painted a much richer picture of Seraphin’s involvement.  He and the 
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other three occupants all hailed from the metropolitan New York area.  They were found 
in a minivan with no luggage or other belongings to suggest that they planned to be in the 
Pittsburgh area for longer than it took to pay a visit to each of the stores they visited on a 
single day.  There was also no evidence to suggest that Seraphin joined the group 
midstream or that his presence in the minivan on March 3 was purely by chance.  This is 
especially true in the light of the Peace Bridge incident months later.  Thus, as the 
Government argues, a rational juror could conclude that Seraphin’s presence in the 
minivan was “deliberate, purposeful, and not the result of simply being in the wrong van 
on the wrong date and in the company of the wrong type of people.”       
 The same reasoning applies to the substantive counts. 
*    *    *    *    * 
 For these reasons, we affirm. 
 
